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Systems providing financial security for the old are under increasing strain
throughout the world. Over the next 35 years, the proportion of the world's
population that is over 60 will almost double, from 9 percent to 16 percent.
Populations are aging rapidly due to rising life expectancies and declining fertility
rates. This puts added strain on extended families and other traditional ways of
supporting the old which are already weakening under-the  pressure of urbanization,
industrialization, and increased mobility. At the same time, public systems of old age
security are themselves in need of reform. Most existing systems are very costly even
though they provide inadequate protection for the old.
Pension reform is not easy, however. Issues involved are complex and can be
controversial; meaningful reform efforts face political hurdles. Nevertheless, reform
is inevitable, since the longer it is delayed, the more urgent and difficult it becomes.
More and more countries are confronting  this problem. Figure 1 shows that many
countries around the world have undertaken some type of reform of their pension
system in recent years.  The World Bank has been quite active in providing policy
advice and technical assistance  to governments contemplating  pension reform. In
virtually every country in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and in many
African and Asian countries  the Bank has engaged in extensive discussions, formal
and informal, on pension reform (see Figure 2).
The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief summary and evaluation of recent
pension reforms around the world.'  The next section  briefly discusses why so many
countries had to reform in recent 'years.  Section 3 describes  different types of potential
reform options.  Section 4 provides statistics on which reform options the countries
are choosing. Section 5 provides an evaluation of different reform options taking into
account fiscal, intergenerational  and political economy costs. The last section
concludes.
The period covered is 1992-1998. Sources  include Social Security Programns  Around the World,
Social Security Administration, various years; Developments  and Trends in Social Security, 1993-95,
Report of the Secretary General, International  Social Security Association; various issues of
International Social Security Review; staff files at the U.S. Social Security Library; World Bank staff
files. All information included in the data sets has been verified by at least 2 sources.
1II.  Why are Countries  Reforming?
Old age security systems have three major objectives -- saving, redistribution,
and insurance.  Most formal systems of old age security are publicly managed
schemes that are financed by payroll taxes on a largely pay-as-you-go basis, so that
today's workers pay the pensions of those who have retired.  These systems not only
affect the welfare of the old, but also that of the young, who must, directly or
indirectly shoulder the cost of providing for the old. Therefore, a good pension
system should not only protect the old, but it should also promote, or at least not
hinder, economic growth.
However, most existing systems fail to provide adequately for the old since
benefits are not always indexed. Furthermore, they frequently cause perverse
redistribution, for example from poor young families to comfortable retirees. Most
importantly, as these systems  mature, they may actually hinder growth. In maturing
systems, providing a constant level of benefits to a growing number of retirees
requires high wage taxes, which cause widespread evasion and push labor into the less
efficient informal sector. This increases the burden on the public treasury and can
lead to deficit spending that fuels inflation. Rising fiscal deficits can also squeeze out
growth-promoting public spending, such as investments in infrastructure, education,
or in health services for the young. Also, some economists believe that existing
systems have induced people to save less than they otherwise would, leading to lower
levels of national savings and growth.  So these government-run systems hurt the
economy while they also fail to protect the old.
Moreover, current systems are also fiscally unsustainable.  While most public
plans accumulate a cash surplus in their early years, as the systems mature, these
reserves disappear and the plans shift into deficit. Therefore, the initial cash surplus is
an illusion, since it is only a partial offset to the implicit pension debt that is building
up.2 Figure 3 plots pension system surplus or deficits as a share of total revenues for
a sample of countries in 1986. While most countries with young populations, such as
Egypt, Korea, Jordan and Tunisia, had systems with surpluses, most industrialized
2 Estimates of implicit pension liabilities for OECD countries can be found in Van Der Nood, P. and
Herd. R., "Estimating Pension Liabilities  - A Methodological Framework," OECD Economic Studies
23 (1994), 131-66. Estimates of implicit pension liabilities for developing countries can be found in
Kane, C. and Palacios, R., "The Implicit Pension Debt," Finance and Development, June 1996, 36-38.
2countries and older Latin American and Eastern European countries faced deficits,
forcing them to rely primarily on pay-as-you-go finance, supplemented  by growing
payments from the national treasury. As populations continue to age, deficits become
much greater than can be covered by current tax rates. This requires a cut in pension
benefits or other government spending, or alternatively a rise in taxes.
Given all these pressures to change the existing systems, it is not surprising that
so many countries around the world are undertaking pension reform. However, not
all reforms provide a permanent solution  to the above problems. Most are merely
designed to delay the impending crisis for a few more years.  The next section
discusses different reform options governments have in dealing with their old age
security problems.
III.  Typology of Reform: What are Possible Reform Options?
Pension systems can be classified by three criteria:  how benefits are calculated
and the party which covers shortfalls, how benefits are financed, and who manages
the system. Benefit calculation can be based on replacing some income level, defined
as what an individual  earned over some period of time and/or the economy-wide
average wage.  Such systems are known as defined benefit systems, where the
individual knows that the pension depends on years of service, and the average wage
rate earned in the last X years, as determined by the benefit formula. The revenues of
such systems are less certain, since they depend on demographic changes,  the rate of
wage growth, and the rate of return on investments should a fund be accumulated.
Any shortfall in revenues relative to expenditures is covered by an entity other than
the beneficiary, the government in the case of a public plan, and an employer in the
case of a private occupational plan. Depending on how such a benefit is defined, in
theory, there may be some residual risk to the individual arising from fluctuations in
an individual's work history, but this would be the only risk borne by the individual.
In practice, as the following sections will show, the parameters of such systems are
changed very often so that an individual who begins work and begins contributing
under some pension rules rarely retires under the same set of pension rules.
Alternatively,  benefits can be based on what individuals contribute  to the
system, allowing some rate of return, compounded annually. This type of system isknown as a defined contribution system. In this system, the benefits are considered
less defined, because they depend on an individual's complete work history and the
accumulated rate of return.  The individual receives what is in his account upon
retirement, so there is no possibility of shortfalls. All risks are borne by the individual
in the form of higher or lower pensions.
Defined benefits can be financed either through pay as you go financing or
through full funding. Under pure pay as you go financing, current workers'
contributions are used immediately to pay benefits to current retirees, resulting in no
positive impact  on savings and perhaps a negative impact, although some economists
have found unambiguously negative effects. Under full funding, current workers'
contributions are accumulated in pension funds and invested, resulting in some
positive impact on savings, particularly if people are forced to save more than they
would have voluntarily. However, the degree of actual funding is based on projected
interest rate and earnings paths. Should the projected deviate from the actual,
shortfalls may occur even in fully funded, defined benefit plans and require additional
contributions from the guarantor.
Defined contribution systems,  by definition, are always fully funded. 3 People
receive only what they have accumulated, resulting in no shortfalls, although there
may be public costs associated with any minimum pension or rate of return
guarantees, if offered.
Similarly,  the funds, whether  reserves accumulate in a partially funded PAYG
or under full funding, can be managed either privately or publicly. While public or
private management could relate to the entire administrative apparatus of the system,
the critical feature appears to be the management of the funds. Private management
of the funds allows the fumds  to be separated from the political process so that the
funds are managed for the retiree's best interest rather than being forced to fulfill
other political objectives.
The three classifications generally coincide.  Defined benefit systems, on the
national level, are all funded through pay as you go financing, although in some cases
3  The Swedish notional account system is sometimes referred to as a PAYG, defined contribution
system, but since  the potential for revenue shortfall exists and the resulting risk is borne by the
government, such a system in fact is merely a variant of a defined benefit system and should be labeled
as such.
4small funds have been accumulated to partially delay the impact of ageing. These
systems are generally publicly administered  and since there are few funds to manage,
fund management usually ends up with the public administration as well. Defined
contribution systems are by definition financed by full funding. While these systems
are often privately managed, the large national provident funds common in Asia and
Africa are publicly managed, defined contribution, fully funded schemes.
We classify potential reform options into two principal categories:  minor
adjustments and major reforms (see Table 1). Minor adjustments are changes made to
the existing public schemes primarily to delay fiscal problems, but sometimes to
correct existing inequities. These can take many different forms. Governments can
alter the eligibility criteria for receiving pensions, the contribution structure,  the
benefit structure, or the adminstration of the scheme, or do a combination  of several
adjustments. Unfortunately most of these reforms are not sufficient to address the
underlying problems of  public pension plaris, but do succeed in temporarily
postponing the fiscal crisis.
We define major reforms as those which substantively change the system of
pension provision from defined benefit to defined contribution, or vice versa, or from
pay as you go to full funding, or vice versa.  Starting up a new system is also
classified as a major reform since it is a substantive change from before. Substantive
PAYG reforms with new mandatory defined contribution components are also
included as major reforms.
While many countries are reforming their pension systems, only about 25
percent of those reforms can be classified as major reforms (see Figure 4).  A third of
those major reforms are either switches from funded to pay-as-you-go systems or
setting up of a new pay-as-you-go system. Most other reforms take the form of minor
adjustments to the existing pay-as-you-go systems. A  list of countries and the
different types of pension reforms they have adopted are given in Table 2.
Figure 5 shows the frequency of different adjustments countries made to their
existing systems. Changing the contribution rate is the most popular adjustment
followed by changes in pension formula. However, an increasing number of countries
has undertaken a major reform, with the number exceeding those who raised the
retirement age. Other reforms include changes in the number of years of service
5required before receipt of a pension, indexation of the pension once received, and the
wage base on which the contributions to the pension system are calculated.
Regional Differences
Figure 6 reports the breakdown of reforms by region. The rate of reform is
highest in countries which face the worst demographic pressures. Former socialist
countries were the top reformers, followed by industrialized countries and Latin
American countries.  The relatively younger populations of Sub-Saharan Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East clearly have not felt the urgency of reform as strongly as
the older countries. Reform efforts in the Former Soviet Union were also spurred by
the necessity of the newly independent countries to establish their own pension
systems.
The type of reforms adopted by countries in different regions also varies
significantly. Quite a few Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Bolivia,
Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, Peru, and El Salvador, undertook major reforms,
switching from government-run pay-as-you-go pension systems to multi-pillar
systems with a defined-benefit private component. While there are many factors that
contributed to this preference for major reform,  Chile's success with its pension
reform in the 1  980s seems to have had a positive demonstration  effect in this region.
This reform has also now spread to Eastern Europe where Poland, Hungary,
Latvia, and Kazakstan have undertaken major reforms amid the abundance of minor
reforms in the region.
Another region that has undertaken a significant number of major reforms is
Sub-Saharan Africa.  However, these numbers are deceptive since the major reforns
in Africa are very different than those in Latin America. With the exception of
Seychelles, the African countries either switched from provident funds to pay-as-you-
go systems (Nigeria) or set up completely new pay-as-you-go systems.
In industrialized countries, most of the reforms were in the form of changes
made to the existing public system. Exceptions are Australia, the United Kingdom,
and Sweden. In the case of Australia, a fully funded, defined contribution second
pillar was added to a general revenue-fimded means-tested universal pension. In the
case of Sweden, a public pay-as-you-go financed, defined benefit system is being
6converted to a pay as you go financed, notional account system, with a small funded,
defined contribution  pillar.  In the U.K., individuals have been given the option of
substituting an occupational or personal pension for the publicly provided earnings-
related benefit.
In general there were few reforms in Asia and the Middle East. The major
reforms in this region took the form of either establishment of new pay-as-you-go
systems or switches to such public schemes.
In summary,  while the nature and frequency of major reforms varied across
regions, adjustments to the existing public pensions were still the predominant  type of
reform in all regions, although the number of major reforms is rising. Next, we
discuss individual reforms in greater detail.
Minor Reforms
Adjustment  to public systems, the minor reforms, involve changes in eligibility
citeria, the contribution structure and the benefit structure of the systems.
Changes in eligibility criteria-- Eligibility criteria for pensions can be changed
by altering  the retirement age or the service years required to qualify for a pension.
Both types of reforms occurred although changes in retirement age were more
common. Figures 7 and 8 report the retirement age changes for men and women,
respectively. For all countries, other than Greece, there have been increases in
retirement age, consistent with rising life expectancies. While there is still a tendency
to set a lower retirement age for women, this gap has been declining.  Some countries
also changed  the number of required service years for full entitlement (see Figure 9),
in all cases increasing the number of years required.
Changes in contribution structure -- Countries changed the contribution
structure of their pensions by changing the contribution rates and the contribution
base on which the contributions are calculated. Among these reforms, the change in
the contribution  rates was the most commonly adopted one across countries.
Contributions  to a pay-as-you-go system can be made by the employees, the
employers,  or the government, as a percentage of wages. Figures 10 and 1  1 show the
changes  the countries made in contribution rates for the employers and employees,
respectively. More countries  have opted to change the contribution rates of
7employers  rather than that of employees. About 75 percent of these changes have
been increases. However, there have also been declines, especially where the
contribution  rates were initially high, such as those in the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, or where the payment was shifted from employer to
employee during a major reform, as in the case of Bolivia and Uruguay. Fewer
countries changed contributions of their employees.  Again, almost 80 percent of
these changes have been increases. Some of the largest increases were made by
transitional countries, such as Albania, Bulgaria, and Czech Republic which
previously had zero contribution  rates for their employees.  The declines have been
few and small in magnitude. Changes in government contributions have been few,
only made in six countries. 4 Among those, only Libya and Taiwan, decreased the
government's contribution  rate.
Change in the contribution base is another type of reform similarly aimed at
changing  the contribution structure of the pension system. Generally, contribution
base changes were less common than changes in the contribution rate. Mostly these
took the form of  abolishing minimum income limits or increasing the maximum
income limits on which the contributions are made, to maximize the total amount of
contributions collected. (See Table 3).
Changes  in benefit structure  --  Many countries  reformed  their benefit  structure
through changes  in pensionformula  and in indexation.  Changing  the  pensionformula
was a  common type of reform. Countries with older populations (such as Portugal
and Switzerland) decreased accrual rates or increased the number of years used to
calculate  the pensionable salary (which decreases it) leading to lower replacement
rates. However younger countries (such as Senegal and Sudan) modified their
pension formulas (through  higher accrual rates, higher pensionable salary or higher
percent of replacement) such that they increased their benefits (see Table 4).  Another
type of reform is.  changing the way benefits are indexed to inflation (see Table 5).
Most important improvements  were for those countries that replaced their ad hoc
inflation adjustment with a structured adjustment, whether they tied these adjustments
to price or wage changes.
4  These  are Bolivia (1% to 1.5%),  Mexico (.3% to .42%), Cyprus (3.5% to 4%), Israel (1.49% to
2.05%),  Libya (3.40% to .53%), and Taiwan (2.8% to 0%).
8Major Reforms
PA YG-Defined  Benefit to Fully Funded-Defined  Contribution
Countries undertaking major reforms of their pension system were fewer
compared to those making adjustments to their existing systems. Table 6 provides
summary reform features of  countries that switched  from exclusively pay-as-you-go
defined benefit systems to systems which are at least partially fully funded, defined
contribution. We include the case of Chile for comparison, which reformed prior to
the period of study, but since it was the first reform of this type often serves as the
basis for comparison for the other reforms. While the principles underlying these
reforms are similar each country has adopted the basic design to suit its own political
and economic structure.
Major reform involves many of the challenges  of minor reform, but also
additional ones.5  The role of the fully fumded,  defined contribution pillar needs to be
defined.  In the case of Chile, the first reformer of this type, this pillar is the primary
pension provider. Subsequent reforms, including those in Mexico, Bolivia, El
Salvador, and Kazakhstan, have followed this example of using the fully funded,
defined contribution  system as the primary system. Other countries, such as
Colombia and Peru, have also made the fully-fumded  defined-contribution (FF-DC)
the primary system, but have given workers the choice of a pay-as-you-go defined-
benefit (PAYG-DB) as the primary system if they prefer.  Argentina and Hungary
have retained a PAYG-DB for the primary system, but have opted for giving workers
a choice between a PAYG-DB and a FF-DC for a mandatory supplementary  system.
Uruguay has retained a PAYG-DB for the primary system as well, but has made the
FF-DC a mandatory second pillar for those of moderate income and optional, but
subsidized, for those of low incomes. Poland and Latvia have converted their PAYG-
DB schemes into notional accounts PAYG schemes  with a mandatory second pillar
that is FF-DC.  Australia has instituted a FF-DC pillar as a complement  to a general
revenue-financed means-tested pension.  While currently serving as a complement to
5  Most  countries  reform  their public  pension  plan  before  introducing  new structure.  Examples  are
Argentina, Colombia,  Peru.
6  Latvia's mandatory FF-DC pillar is contemplated, but not yet legislated.
9the main system, eventually it will be the main system, particularly for the third of the
population which receives nothing from the means-tested system.
Countries also have to decide how to provide a social safety net for those who
were lifetime poor or had uneven working histories. In Chile, this is provided through
a minimum pension guarantee and minimum  rate of return requirements, as is the case
in Colombia, El Salvador, and Mexico also. In the case of Argentina, Uruguay,
Poland, Hungary, and Latvia, the first pillar pensions serve as the social safety net.
Peru chose no safety net provision, aside from general social assistance, reasoning
that since there was no safety net in the previous system, providing a safety net should
not be considered part of the major reform, but additional reform to be considered
later.  Australia, as noted before, has a means-tested safety net for all elderly.
This type of major reform also entails decisions on transition mechanisms. In
pay as you go financing, current workers' contributions are used to pay benefits for
current retirees.  When the system reforms toward a FF-DC system, current workers'
contributions are diverted into their own pension accounts, forcing the government to
cover current retirees'  pensions. In addition, workers who contributed to the old
system will have less in their individual  accounts than those who work the same
number of years, but always under the new system.  To maintain equity, some
transition mechanism needs to be provided which recognizes and rewards an
individual's acquired rights in the old system. Typical transition mechanisms, used in
Chile, Colombia, and Peru, are to issue recognition bonds to workers, in recognition
of what they are owed on the basis of their accrued rights under the old system, which
become payable at retirement age. Upon retirement, individuals will convert to an
annuity both their own accrued funds, plus the principal plus interest from these
recognition bonds.  The mechanisms for calculating the value of these recognition
bonds and the interest rate paid on the bonds both vary from country to country. In
Argentina and Hungary, by contrast, individuals receive a pension from the old
system in direct proportion to years served under the old system. In Uruguay, all
years served, under either system, are used to qualify a person for a first-pillar
pension. Mexico has the most unique mechanism for recognizing acquired rights.
Workers with contributions to the old system have the right to the benefits they would
have been entitled to under the old system or what has been accrued under the new
10system, whichever is higher.
Related to this issue is the status of the old, PAYG-DB system.  In some
countries all new workers must enter the new system, as in Chile, Mexico, El
Salvador, Bolivia, Poland, Hungary, and Kazakstan.  However, a few countries found
it politically difficult to mandate FF-DC accounts, even as second pillars, for new
workers. In these countries, Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay and Peru, the old PAYG
systems were reformed, but new workers have the choice of a purely PAYG-DB
pension system. 7
Another set of problems involves  the government's  regulatory capacity or the
extent of development of the domestic capital markets. In Chile an elaborate system
of government regulations and guarantees was constructed to permit the safe and
sound functioning of the new pension funds.  For the first few years, investments were
mostly in bank and government debt.  A short supply of government bonds, the
absence of a secondary market for government debt, and the lack of alternative
investment  opportunities in domestic markets (such as corporate bonds or stocks)
generally  raise concerns about where the new pension funds can be invested.
Imperfections  in domestic capital markets can be avoided through international
diversification, but reforming countries generally limit that option due to political
reasons. Pension fund management expertise is also quite limited in many countries,
although there are a number of foreign firms that have been willing to enter many of
these markets and offer these services. The size of the market is also a consideration,
as there are strong economies of scale in pension fund administration. Bolivia, for
these reasons, chose to limit the available pension funds to two, and to assign
individuals to one or the other in the short term, allowing change after a period of 2 I/2
years, and with new pension funds allowed to enter the market after 5 years. The
pension funds were chosen in an international bidding process and their investment
practices are regulated by the Financial Sector Superintendency. The pension funds
are required by law to invest at least 10 percent of assets abroad.
7  In Uruguay, even new workers earning above a certain salary (5000 May 1995 pesos) must pay a
portion of the contribution rate paid on the salary above 5000 pesos into a fully funded DC account.
11PAYG-Defined Benefit to PAYG Notional Account  with Fully Funded Second Pillar
The Latvian, Swedish, Italian, and Polish reforms take a different approach.
They assign individuals notional individual accounts which are credited with
contributions made by individuals. Governments can also provide credit for years
spent in military service, higher education, raising children, or other worthwhile
causes by making contributions directly to these accounts. However, this money
cannot tangibly be found in any account or in any investment portfolio. It is in fact
being used by the government to pay pensions for the current elderly, precluding the
government's need for financing the transition to a fully funded-defined contribution
system. Each year the individual's account is also credited with notional interest
payments earned on the notional accumulation. This interest rate is legislated and
varies in the countries undertaking this type of reform; Sweden is using the growth of
nominal wages, Latvia the growth of  the social insurance contribution wage base,
Poland inflation plus 75% of the growth of the social insurance contribution  wage
base and Italy, which has undertaken this type of reform without adding a second
pillar, the growth of nominal GDP.
The advantages of this type of reform, although continuing to be PAYG-
financed are primarily threefold. First, by tying benefits to contributions rather than
to income, individuals have stronger incentives to make contributions and fewer
incentives to evade and distort labor market provision.  Second, the pension provided
depends on both the accumulated sum in one's notional account and on the average
life expectancy at the age at which the pension is started. As life expectancy increases
due to health improvements,  the pension if taken at the same age will fall,
encouraging individuals to delay retirement if their objective is to reach a target
pension level.  Thus, from a fiscal standpoint, the individuals collectively bear the
cohort-specific longevity risk rather than the government bearing the risk as in the
conventional PAYG-defined  benefit systems. Third, the transition issues of financing
the payments to current pensioners when current contributions are diverted to
individual  funded accounts do not arise since the contributions are not actually
diverted.
However, in comparison,  with fully funded-defined contribution systems, these
systems do have some drawbacks. First, there are no additional savings generated in
12the economy  to stimulate investrnent and growth. Second, from a fiscal standpoint,
the government still holds an unfunded liability. And, the liability, the acquired right,
is clearly defined; in the traditional defined-benefit systems, as we have shown,
features such as benefit formulas change frequently, allowing the governments  to
reduce the implicit pension liabilities.  Since most individuals are only vaguely aware
of the monetary equivalent of their acquired rights, reducing them is politically
feasible. However, once they become clearly defined, with explicit monetary
equivalents,  reducing them will be more difficult. It becomes then the burden of the
government to accurately prepare for all future contingencies when adopting such a
system, since subsequent changes will be much more difficult. Third, while trying the
benefit to contributions helps, making transparent the PAYG implicit interest rate,
which will be below market interest rates, may not reduce inflation much.
Fully Funded Defined Contribution to PAYG, Defined-Benefit
A few countries have made the reverse reform from a fully-funded, defined
contribution  system to a PAYG-defined benefit system. The funds in the old systems
were held by provident funds, all publicly managed and administered, or more
accurately,  publicly mismanaged. Given a history of gross abuses of these funds,
some African and Asian countries have turned to PAYG systems, reasoning that if the
public authorities  have no fund accumulations to manage, the abuses will be fewer.
Having seen abuses in both types of systems in Latin America and given the fiscal
concerns involved with PAYG programs, our experience suggests an alternative:
private management of fully-funded defined contribution systems. However, these
reforms are clearly major reforms and are cataloged as such here.
V. Evaluation of Different Reform Options
Sections  II-IV suggest that countries have taken widely differing approaches  to
pension reform, although the various reforms can be categorized into broad
categories. Which approaches are best?  Before evaluating the different reform
options, we need to define the objectives of a pension system to see which reforms are
more consistent  with the initial objectives. Pension systems first and foremost are
meant to provide workers with the means to sustain themselves when they become too
13old to work, complemented by redistributing towards the poorest elderly. Whether
the pension system provides the means to sustain workers in old age critically
depends on the rate of return it provides workers on their contributions. But given the
conflicting needs on the government's coffers, the pension system has to be designed
in such a way as to be fiscally sustainable in the long run.  It should also work to
enhance economic efficiency by minimizing labor market distortions, enhancing
capital market development, and generating savings.
Long Run Fiscal Sustainability
Most of the reforms taking place, aside from those in the youngest countries,
were in response to fiscal problems.  Given the political cost of pension reform, it
would be preferable to undertake a reform which fixes the problem, precluding the
need for yet another reforrn in five years' time.  Which of the reforms discussed above
perform best in achieving long run fiscal sustainability?
Figure 12 takes the hypothetical case of one potentially reforming country,
Costa Rica, and looks at the current system, and different types of minor reforms
which could be undertaken. The minor reforms are calibrated to mimic what
countries who actually undertook such reforms did on average. Taking the most
easily quantifiable reforms, raising the retirement age, lowering benefits, and raising
contribution rates, we find that countries on average raised retirement age by 4.3
years, and raised contribution rates by 3 percentage points.  Benefit rates are harder to
measure since benefits often depend on years of service and changes in the pension
base which affect the benefit rate are harder to compare across countries. For
illustration, we assume a 20% reduction in benefits. Figure 12 shows the impact of
such minor reforms on the required outlay by the government over time, assuming
that any deficits in the system will be automatically picked up by the government.
While each of the reforms improves the fiscal situation in the medium term and is
certainly superior to the no-reform option, none is sufficient in the long term. By
2020, the reform which reduces benefit rates begins to require significant government
funding. By 2030, all the minor reforms require considerable government funding.
Further pension system reforms will be required unless the government is flush
enough with revenue to be willing to cover deficits indefinitely.
14By contrast, a major reform toward a fully-funded, defined contribution system
is shown in the last bar in Figure 12. The reform illustrated is a complete switch from
the current defined benefits, PAYG system to a fully-funded, defined contribution
system, with all current pensioners continuing to receive benefits, which would now
be funded by the government and current workers receiving bonds which value the
prorated liabilities that the current workers are owed. Note that no countries have
actually done such a drastic switch.  Current  contributors are always given the choice
of remaining within the old system, albeit a reformed version of the old system.
However, Figure 12 illustrates the worst case scenario, where an immediate and
involuntary switch was dictated.
While the reform is costly in the short run, since the contributions from workers
can no longer be used to fund pensions for current retirees, in the longer run, the
reform is fully sustainable,  with only minimum input from the government depending
on the government's generosity in providing a social safety net for the poor.  In the
very short term, in the year 2000, the major reform is even more costly than the option
of doing no reform. However, by 2020, one of the minor reforms, the benefit
reduction, is already more expensive. By 2030, all of the minor reforms are more
expensive. After 2040, the costs to the government of the major reform disappear, as
obligations to pensioners existing at the time of the reform are fulfilled and
obligations to workers  with contributions to the old system disappear. The small
initial cost more than compensates for the later savings. The cost of providing a
social safety net will have to be added to the costs of the DC reform, but given the
enormous savings in the future, there is ample opportunity to provide a modest safety
net, even at government  expense.
Impact of Repeated Minor Reforms
A major distinction,  then, between the minor and major reforms is that minor
reform efforts will have to be repeated periodically. Aside from the political
difficulties and inconvenience of perpetual reform, are there any concrete reasons to
avoid repeated minor reforms? One issue that arises is that repeated minor reforms
undermine the view that the pension system provides security or certainty in terms of
15retirement benefits. 8 While defined benefit systems are called defined benefit
systems, they are being continually redefined, leading to a certain amount of
uncertainty on the part of workers.
Furthermore,  all of the minor reforms used by countries tend to reduce the
implicit rate of return that younger, future generations receive from the pension
system. As contribution  rates are raised, younger generations pay more for the same
benefits, lowering  their rate of return on contributions. Similarly, if benefits are
reduced, younger generations receive fewer benefits for the same contributions, again,
lowering their rate of return. And finally, raising retirement ages forces workers to
contribute longer, and therefore more, and to receive benefits for a shorter period, and
therefore less than previous generations.
Figure 13 shows the impact of raising contribution rates and lowering benefits
to maintain fiscal sustainability in Costa Rica in lieu of letting the government cover
future deficits on the rate of return received by future cohorts. Contribution rates
would have to be raised to 35% percent from the current 7.5% if the entire
adjustment were covered through changes in contribution rates, while benefit rates
would have to fall from 68% of average wage to 14.6 percent if the entire adjustment
were covered through changes in benefit rates. As a result, in both cases of minor
reform, by the year 2015, the rate of return from pension contributions falls below the
rates available in the market, and continues  to fall indefinitely. By contrast, the
defined contribution  reform continues to show a market rate of return, and keeps the
expected rate of return constant for all future cohorts.
Returning to the objectives of a pension system, if the objective is to give
workers a way to maintain an adequate living standard when they become too old to
earn a living, forcing them to participate in a system which provides them a far lower
rate of return than if they had simply saved the money themselves seems
counterproductive. The only way to maintain the central role a pension system can
play in the lives of workers and retirees is to reform it in such a way that they will
always receive what the market would have provided on average, with some
8  An analysis of the impact of recent changes and the effect on the individual  are included in McHale,
The Risk of Social Security Benefit Rule Changes: Some International Evidence, NBER Working
Paper 7031, 1999.
16redistribution  toward the poor to ensure against extreme poverty among the elderly.
Economic Efficiency Gains  from a Major Reform
Furthermore, a major reform toward a fully-funded, defined contribution system
that is competitively managed will also lead to greater economic  efficiency by
reducing labor market distortions, enhancing capital market development, and
potentially generating additional savings for the economy.
Labor market distortions exist in PAYG, defined benefit systems because
benefits are not closely linked to contributions. As a result, individuals have
incentives  to evade contributions by joining the informal sector and contributing only
enough to qualify for a pension. Individuals also have an incentive to withdraw from
the labor force early, as early retirement rarely carries actuarially  fair reductions in
pension benefits.  Similarly,  postponement of retirement rarely generates actuarially
fair increments to pension benefits. Finally, high contribution  rates with below-
market rates of return also lead to higher evasion, as individuals rightfully calculate
their losses from joining the system, or conversely lead to higher labor costs if
employers are asked to pay high taxes for benefits their employees do not value.
Fully funded, defined contribution systems, with sufficient,  but not overly
generous safety nets, on the other hand, tie contributions to benefits. Employees are
more likely to see these contributions as deferred compensation  rather than labor
market taxes because the employees will see all their money  returned to them in the
future with interest at market rates. Competitive management  insures that the
participants will receive rates of return not markedly different from market returns on
their contributions.
Similarly, fully-funded, defined contribution systems can lead to capital market
development by providing a supply of long term investible funds. Institutional
investors have contributed heavily to the deepening and strengthening of capital
markets in developed countries. Evidence of this deepening has been noted in
countries which have undertaken these reforms. 9
Finally, these reforms can be growth-enhancing by also increasing savings.
9  See, for example, R. Holzman, "Pension Reform, Financial Market  Development, and Economic
Growth: Preliminary Evidence from Chile", IMF Staff Paper (Vol. 44: 149-78, June 1997).
17While there is concern that these systems will not generate  additional savings, but will
merely crowd out previous voluntary savings, the limited evidence from developed
countries shows that when mandatory savings plans are instituted, there is indeed
crowding out among higher income individuals who were previously saving.
However, there is new saving generated among lower-income  individuals, indicating
a net positive impact from mandating a savings system.
VI. Conclusions
To conclude, countries around the world are reforming their pension systems.
Most are reforming to reduce the fiscal costs of their existing pension systems. A few
young countries are establishing new systems or are increasing the generosity of their
current systems, although perhaps not always taking into account the future fiscal
costs entailed in the increased generosity.
The majority of the pension reforms are tinkering with an existing pay-as-you-
go defined benefit system, rather than reform of the overall system of pension
provision.  However, while these reforms alleviate some of the fiscal burden, fiscal
problems reappear in the long term.  The only way to effectively solve the pension
system issue on a permanent basis is to move toward the fully-funded defined
contribution reforms currently underway in Latin America, Australia, Poland and
Kazakhstan under consideration in a variety of other countries.
18Table 1:  Framework  for Assessing Pension Reform Measures
Status  Type of Reform  Measure of Change
Minor  Eligibility Criteria  Retirement age
Service years
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19Table 2:  Different Types of Pension Reforms
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22Table 3:  Old/New Contribution Base
Barbados  Maximum:  B$6  r/eek  Maximum: B70we
Dominica  Maximum:  Maximum:
EC$36,000/year  EC$60,000/year
France  Maximum:  11,340  Maximum:  13,720
francs/month  francs/month
Nigeria  Maximum:  48,000
naira/year
Sudan  Minimum:  34 pounds/
month;  Maximum:  100
pounds/ month
23Table 4:  Old/New Benefit Structure
Armenia  55% of assessed wage for 25120  60% of the average  of any
years of service male/female  and  consecutive  5 of the last  15 years
1% for each additional year;  for 25/20 years of service
assessed wage is 100% of the  male/female and 1% for each
average of the best 5 years of the  additional year
last 15 if earnings are up to 4
minimum  wages and as low as 15%
of the average if earnings are as
high as 10 times minimum wage
Belarus  55% of assessed wage for 25/20  55% of the average of any
years of service male/female and  consecutive 5 of the last 15 years
1% for each additional year;  for 25/20 years of service
assessed wage is 100% of the  male/female and 1% for each
average of the best 5 years of the  additional year
last 15 if earnings are up to 4
minimum  wages and as low as 15%
of the average if earnings are as
high as 10 times minimum wage
Congo  30% of the average of the last 3 or  40% of the average of the last 3 or
last 5 years for 20 years of service  last 5 years for 20 years of service
and 2% for each additional year  and 2% for each additional year
Czech  50% of the best 5 of the last 10  Basic flat rate plus 1.5% of average
Republic  years for 25 years of service and  indexed earnings for each year of
1% for each additional year up to  insurance after 1985 with 4%
35 years  increase for each year worked
beyond retirement age
Denmark  Maximum on employment related:  Maximum on employment related:
22,700; Maximum on income-  13,500; Maximum on income-
tested supplement: 3,534  tested supplement: 3,709
Ecuador  50% of the average of the best 5  75% of the average of the best 5
years for 5 years of service and  years for 30 years of service and
1.25%  for each additional year  1.25% for each additional year
Estonia  55% of assessed wage for 25/20  410 EEK plus 3.2% for every year
years of service male/female and  covered from 15-19 years, 3.3% for
1% for each additional year;  every year covered from 20-24
assessed  wage is 100% of the  years, 3.4% for 25-29 years, 3.7%
average of the best 5 years of the  for 30-34 years, 3.8% for 35-39
last 15 if earnings are up to 4  years, and 4% for 40 or more years
minimum  wages and as low as 15%
of the average if earnings are as
high as 1O  times minimum  wage
Finland  412 marks per month plus 1.5%  of  1.5% of average earnings from
24Coiuitry  U
average of the middle 2 earning  1991, but no more than 10 years,
years of the last 4  eliminating highest and lowest
years, for every year of service,
with 2.5% for every service  year
above the age of 60
France  50% of the average of the best 10  25-50% of the average of the best
years since 1947  25 years since 1947, depending on
age and length of service
Greece  Minimum pension: 64,860  Minimum pension: 86,940
drachmas per month increased by  drachmas per month increased by
1% for each dependent  1% for each dependent
Iran  2.9% per year of service of the  3.3% per year of service of the
average of the last 2 years  average of the last 2 years
Kyrgyz  55% of assessed wage for 25/20  55% of the average of any 5
Republic  years of service male/female and  consecutive of the last 15 years for
1% for each additional year;  25/20 years of service male/female
assessed wage is 100% of the  and 1% for each additional  year
average of the best 5 years of the
last 15 if earnings are up to 4
minimum wages and as low as 15%
of the average if earnings are as
high as 10  times minimum wage
Lithuania  .55% of assessed wage for 25/20  Basic pension no less than 110% of
years of service male/female and  poverty level and supplemental
1% for each additional year;  pension based on years of coverage
assessed wage is 100% of the  and ratio of individual earnings to
average of the best 5 years of the  national average
last 15 if earnings are up to 4
minimum wages and as low as 15%
of the average if earnings are as
high as 10 times minimum wage
Norway  45% of the current base amount x  42% of the current base amount x
the average number of pension  the average number of pension
points in the best 20 years, with the  points in the best 20 years, with the
maximum of 8 1/3 points per year  maximum of 7 points per year
Panama  60% of the average of the best 3 of  60% of the average of the best 7 of
the last 15 for 15 years of service  the last 15 for 15 years of service
plus 1.25%  for each additional year  plus 1.25% for each additional
between 10 and 20, 1.5% for each  year, and 2% for each year above
additional year above 20, and 2%  pensionable age
for each year above pensionable
age
Portugal  2.2% of the average of the best 5 of  2.0% of the average of the best 10
the last 10 years for each year of  of the last 15 years for each year of
25m  4
service  service
Senegal  1.05% of base earnings for each  1.33%  of base earnings for each
year of service  year of service
Sudan  1.67% of last monthly earnings for  2% of last year's salary for each
each year of service  year of service
26Table 5:  Old/New Pension Indexation
Conr  Ol  P  Wen  i,  r  . xaioi  1ePniot_  M  atio
Belarus  Periodic adjustments for  Adjustments when average
wage and price changes  wage increases more than
15%
Ecuador  Adjusted annually for  Periodic adjustments for
price increases  increases in legal
minimum wage and
inflation
France  Semiannual adjustment  Adjustment for changes  in
for changes in national  cost of living
average wage
Germany  Adjusted annually for  Adjusted annually for
changes in wages  changes in real value of
pensions compared to
changes in earnings
Malta  Adjusted annually for  Adjusted for increases in
changes in wages starting  wages and prices
at age 63
Russia  Periodic adjustments for  Quarterly adjustment
wage and price changes  based on cost of living
changes in the form of
fixed amount or
proportional increase of all
pensions
27Table 6:  Major Reforms Defined Contribution  Systems
Counitry  Funded  Pillar,  Privately  Managed  Safety  Net  Status  of  Old  System  Transition  Mechanism
Argeniina  Optionial  secoid  pillar  First  pillar flat pension  Reformed,  but  openi  to new  workers  Compensatory  pension  for previous  years
of service
Australia  Mandatory  second  pillar  Means-tested  first pillar  Fully functional  Not needed;  second  pillar added  to first
Bolivia  Primary  systemi  Annual  penLsion  bencfit  for those  at least  21  Closed  to  new  workers  and  those  below  Compeosatory  pension
years  of age  in 1995  out  of shares  in state-  age  35
owned  finns
Chile  Primary  Systeml  Mirirnwn Petnsion  Guarantee  Closed  to  new  workers  Recognition  Bonds  payable  at time  of
retiremetat
Colombia  Optionial  primnary  systenm  MiFiinuni  petnsion  guarantee  Slightly  refonned,  but  open  to new  Recognition  bonds
workers
El Salvador  Primary  system  Minimum  pension  guarantee  Closed  to niew  workers  and  those  under  die  Recogitition  bonds
age  of 35
Huigary  Optiotial  secotid  pillar  Earitirgs-related  first pillar  Closed  to nlew  entrants  Compensatory  pension
Kazakhstart  Pritisary  system  Miinimum  petasiDn  guaratmee  Closed  coritpletely  Compensatory  pension
Mexico  Primary  system  Miiniuin pension  guarantee  Closed  completely  Current  workers  retain  rights  to state
pension  if highler
Peru  Optional  primary  system  None  Openi  to  new  workers  Recognitiotn  bonds  at time  of retirement
Poland  Mandatory  second  pillar  Notionial  accounts  first pillar  Closed  to new  etttratits  anmd  workers  under  Notional  initial capital
the  age  of 30
Sweden  Mandatory  second  pillar  Notional  accounts  first  pillar  Conventional  DB clDsed  Compensatory  pensiort  in  transition  to
notional  accounts
Utiited  Kingdom  Optional  second  pillar  Flat  first pillar  Open  to all  Compentsatory  pension  calculated  based  on
last  contribution
Uruguay  Optional  second  pillar  Earnings-related  first  pillar, but  with  Reformed,  but  open  to new  workers  Years  of service  recognized  for those
ceililg  under  40, but  under  new  formula;  older
cohorts  get  refonned  benefits,  phased in
28Figure 1:  Pension Reforms Around the World
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30Figure 3:  Pension System Surplus or Deficit as Share of System Revenues (1986 and Old Age Dependency Ratio 1990)
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33Figure  6:  Regional Breakdown  of Reforms
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Systems  providing financial security  for the old are under increasing
strain throughout the world. Over the next 35 years,  the proportion of
the world's  population  that is  over  60 will almost  double, from 9 percent
to 16 percent.  Populations  are  aging  rapidly  due to rising  life expectancies
and declining fertility rates.  This  puts added  strain on extended  families
and other traditional ways  of supporting  the old  which are already
weakening under the pressure  of urbanization, industrialization, and
increased  mobility. At the same  time, public systems  of old age  security
are themselves  in need  of reform.  Most  existing  systems  are very costly
even  though  they provide inadequate  protection  for the old.  The  purpose
of this paper is to provide a brief summary and evaluation of recent
pension  refroms  around the world.
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